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Civil Procedure-"Final Judgment Rule" in
Workmen's Compensation Cases*
In workmen's compensation proceedings, decisions subject to ap-
peal are normally limited to those expressly called out by statutory
provision.' The criterion most frequently followed is that only final
judgments, orders, or decrees are appealable. 2 This is the rule in
New Mexico.3 A reason often given for the "final judgment rule" is
that interlocutory appeals add to the delay of litigation. In New
Mexico, "the policy behind statutes, rules and decisions permitting
appeals only from final judgments or orders substantially disposing
of the merits of the action is that litigation shall not be piecemeal." 5
The question of the finality of a district court judgment in a work-
men's compensation proceeding was raised in the case of Johnson
v. C & H Construction Company.6
In Johnson the district court found that plaintiff had been injured
in the course of his employment and awarded him compensation for
temporary total disability for a fixed period of time. In addition, if
the plaintiff elected to accept surgery, the judgment directed defend-
ants to pay surgical benefits as well as temporary total disability
compensation for ninety days from the date of the surgery. If plain-
tiff failed to make arrangements for the surgery at the earliest
feasible time, a final order was to be issued by appropriate motion.
The judgment deferred the question of plaintiff's attorney's fees and
any further determination of disability (if surgery were accepted)
*Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., 78 N.M. 423, 432 P.2d 267 (N.M. Ct. App. 1967).
1. See, e.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Motes, 101 Ga. App. 628, 114 S.E.2d
795 (1960) ; Carpenter v. Scanlon, 168 Ohio St. 139, 151 N.E.2d 561 (1958) ; White v.
State Ind. Accident Comm'n, 227 Or. 306, 362 P.2d 302 (1961) ; American Motors Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Wis. 2d 165, 132 N.W.2d 238 (1965).
2. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Globe Indem. Co., 145 Colo. 453, 358
P.2d 885 (1961) ; Pressman v. State Accident Fund, 228 A.2d 443 (Md. 1967) ; Barry
v. Wallace J. Wilck, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 130, 167 A.2d 181 (1961) ; Shoecraft v. Hart's
Food Stores, Inc., 12 A.D.2d 553, 206 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1960) ; Dawson v. Ferguson, 398
P.2d 820 (Okla. 1965) ; Wiles v. Department of Labor and Industries, 34 Wash. 2d 714,
209 P.2d 462 (1949) Moore v. Industrial Comm'n, 4 Wis. 2d 208, 89 N.W.2d 788
(1958).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-16.1(A) (Repl. 1960) states:
Any final order or judgment rendered by the district court under the Work-
men's Compensation Act . . . is reviewable by the state Supreme Court. . ..
4. See, e.g., C. Wright, Federal Courts § 101 (1963).
5. Floyd v. Towndrow, 48 N.M. 444,152 P.2d 391 (1944).
6. 78 N.M. 423, 432 P.2d 267 (N.M. Ct. App. 1967).
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until the matter should come before the court on appropriate mo-
tion of either party.7
Defendants sought to appeal this judgment on the merits. On a
motion before the New Mexico Court of Appeals8 to determine
jurisdiction, held, Not appealable; the issues of disability and at-
torney's fees were yet to be determined.'
This Comment will (1) briefly consider whether the policies be-
hind the Workmen's Compensation Act are satisfied by this holding;
(2) show that none of the geenral reasons why a district court might
wish to retain jurisdiction in a workmen's compensation proceeding
were applicable in this case; and (3) show that the district courtjudgment should have been considered a "final judgment" within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
A determination of whether a judgment in a workmen's compen-
sation case is "final" and thus appealable should not be based solely
on a rule of procedural convenience. Rather, it should take into ac-
count the various provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act,10
viewed together as a whole, as well as the policies that underlie work-
men's compensation. In this respect, it should be noted that the New
Mexico Supreme Court has reiterated time and again its view that
the various provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are to
be liberally construed."
Judgments in workmen's compensation cases must be drawn to
carry out the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act.1 Most
7. The judgment was in part worded as follows:
4. In the event that plaintiff elects to have the surgery . . . then plaintiff may,
at the end of the 90-day period, further petition this court for an award of
disability if he considers that any disability exists.
5....
6. The question of plaintiff's attorney fee will be deferred until such time as
further proceedings are had in this matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant will pay plaintiff medical
expense and compensation as set forth above, and further determination in
this matter will be deferred until this matter shall again come before the court
upon appropriate motion of either party.
8. In 1966, appellate jurisdiction over all actions under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act was transferred to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-
7-8(B) (Supp. 1967).
9. Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., sup a note 6.
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-10-1 through 59-10-37 (Repl. 1960).
11. See, e.g., Gammon v. Ebasco Corp., 74 N.M. 789, 399 P.2d 279 (1965); Em-
ployer's Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Jarde, 73 N.M. 371, 388 P.2d 382 (1963)
Armijo v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 59 N.M. 231, 282 P.2d 712 (1955).
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-16(A) (Repl. 1960).
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American jurisdictions hold that a purpose of workmen's compensa-
tion legislation is to provide a prompt and speedy remedy or
method of settling the claims of injured workmen or their depend-
ents." This view is taken in New Mexico, both through judicial in-
terpretation14 and statutory provisions.15
It is clear that both the district court judgment and the holding
of the court of appeals in Johnson failed with respect to this pur-
pose. The plaintiff suffered injury in the course of his employment
on November 22, 1965, and received compensation through April 5,
1966. The judgment was entered September 9, 1966.16 On Septem-
ber 19, 1966, notice of appeal was filed. On August 11, 1967, the
court of appeals issued its opinion,' and on October 2, 1967, the
district court rendered a final judgment. 9
From April 5, 1966, through October 2, 1967, the plaintiff re-
ceived no compensation payments whatever, although he had under-
gone surgery and, by the terms of the judgment of September 9,
1966, was entitled to medical and surgical payments as well as more
than seven months of temporary total disability compensation. The
reason that no compensation was paid was that no final judgment
had been entered by the district court.20
13. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Globe Indem. Co., 145 Colo. 453, 358
P.2d 885 (1961); Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1964); Hibler v.
Globe Am. Corp., 128 Ind. App. 156, 147 N.E.2d 19 (1958) ; Hobelman v. Mel Krebs
Constr. Co., 188 Kan. 825, 366 P.2d 270 (1961) ; United States Lines Co. v. Jarka Corp.
of New England, 265 F. Supp. 811 (D. Mass. 1967) ; State ex rel Morgan v. Industrial
Accident Board, 130 Mont. 272, 300 P.2d 954 (1956) ; Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co.,
266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966) ; Naseef v. Cord, Inc., 48 N.J. 317, 225 A.2d 343
(1966).
14. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Hill Lines, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 42 (D.N.M. 1954) ; Jones v.
George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, Associated Indem.
Corp. v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 303 U.S. 644 (1938) ; Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co.,
29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903 (1924) ; see also 7 Natural Resources J. 442, 449 (1967).
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-13.10 (A) :
When a workmen's compensation claim is at issue, the judge of the district
court shall advance the cause on the court's calendar and dispose of the case
as promptly as possible. The trial shall be conducted in a summary manner as
far as possible.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-16.1 (A)
Any final order or judgment rendered by the district court under the Work-
men's Compensation Act is reviewable by the state Supreme Court . . ., except
that the appeal shall be advanced on the calendar and disposed of as promptly
as possible.
16. Record at 20.
17. Record at 22.
18. Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., 78 N.M. 423,432 P.2d 267.
19. Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co. Record of final judgment filed October 2, 1967.
(File A-19678, Second Judicial District, County of Bernalillo.)
20. Telephone conversation with Mr. J. E. Casados, attorney for defendants, on
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This result is completely contrary to the intent of workmen's
compensation legislation 2' and can only cause undue hardship to the
plaintiff and his dependents. 22
The question of final judgment in workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings is complicated by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata
literally means the matter has been decided.23 The usual definition
of the doctrine is that an existing final judgment rendered on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is, in all subsequent
actions, conclusive of rights of the parties thereto and of their
privies on all material issues which were or might have been
determined. 24
The application of the doctrine of res judicata to workmen's
compensation proceedings is limited, however. In almost all states,
some provision is made for reopening or modifying workmen's com-
pensation awards or judgments at the level of the commission or court
which had original jurisdiction.2 Reopening is allowed in recognition
of the obvious fact that although a claimant's condition may be diag-
nosed with a great degree of certainty at the time of the original
hearing, the same cannot be said for his future condition. The con-
dition-and hence the degree of disability-may later get worse,
improve, or even clear up altogether. 26
In New Mexico reopening is allowed only on an express showing
of a change of condition in the claimant. Section 59-10-25 (A) of
the Workmen's Compensation Act states:
The district court in which any workman has been awarded
compensation . . . may, upon the application of the employer, work-
man, or other person bound by the judgment, fix a time and place
for hearing upon the issue of claimant's recovery and if it shall appear
upon such hearing that diminution or termination of disability has
October 2, 1967. It should be noted, however, that while the appeal was pending before
the court of appeals, an appeal bond was placed with the court to cover the amount of
any judgment that should be declared due.
21. See, e.g., Wilstead v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 214, 215, 407 P.2d 692,
693 (1965).
22. Presuppose, however, that from the time the judgment was entered, the de-
fendants had made regular compensation payments to the plaintiff as required by the
judgment. Presuppose further that after final judgment was entered, they appealed and
were successful in having the judgment reversed. How could there be any guarantee
that the compensation payments made under the earlier judgment would be recovered?
23. Smith v. Smith, 299 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
24. Klinker v. Klinker, 132 Cal. App. 2d, 687, 283 P.2d 83, 87 (1955).
25. A. Larson, 2 The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 81 (1961).
26. Id.
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taken place, the court shall order diminution or termination of pay-
ments of compensation as the facts may warrant. And if .. . the
disability . ..has become more aggravated or has increased with-
out the fault of the workman, the court shall order an increase in the
amount of compensation allowable as the facts may warrant. Hear-
ings may not be held more frequently than at six-month intervals.
27
The district court in Johnson expressly retained jurisdiction over
the judgment in the original proceeding. Just why is unclear because
there was no necessity that the judgment be held open in order to
avoid having it be res judicata on any future determination of dis-
ability arising from the same cause. The New Mexico Supreme
Court has indicated that this problem is clearly covered by section
59-10-25 (A).
In commenting on an earlier but similar statute, the supreme court
in La Rue v. Johnson28 said that "as the right later to contest ques-
tions of a continuance of the disability is statutory, it would exist
even though a judgment is absolute in form. ' 29 Similarly, with re-
gard to the provisions of section 59-10-25 (A), in Segura v. Jack
Adams General Contractor30 the supreme court has declared:
[T]he ordinary rules of res judicata cannot apply to a judgment
rendered on the merits after trial. In fact, in such a case except for
loss of a specific member of the body there is no final judgment as
it is generally understood short of 550 weeks when either party may
come into court and have a hearing on a decrease or increase of dis-
ability and have a new judgment rendered in accordance with new
findings.81
The supreme court further emphasized this holding in Churchill v.
City of Albuquerque.3 2
In jurisdictions having statutes similar to section 59-10-25 (A),
it is generally held that:
a compensation award is an adjudication as to the condition of the in-
jured workman at the time it is entered, and conclusive of all matters
adjudicable at that time, but is not an adjudication as to the claimant's
future condition. .... 8.
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-25(A) (Supp. 1967).
28. 47 N.M. 260, 141 P.2d 321 (1943).
29. Id. at 268, 141 P.2d at 326.
30. 64 N.M. 413, 329 P.2d 432 (1958).
31. Id. at 416, 329 P.2d at 433. Emphasis added.
32. 66 N.M. 325, 347 P.2d 752 (1959).
33. Annot., 122 A.L.R. 556, 557 (1939).
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One reason why the judgment may have been held open was that
the district court may have felt that it would want to change the
period for which compensation would be paid but was afraid it
could not do so if it did not hold the judgment open. Section
59-10-25 (A) allows the district court, on rehearing, to increase,
diminish, or terminate compensation payments, but it makes no pro-
vision whatever for changing the period for which compensation is
to be paid. However, the fact that a finding of further disability
could change the term for which compensation was to be paid is not
sufficient grounds for failing to issue a final judgment in Johnson.
In Segura the supreme court indicated that it was within the juris-
diction of the district court to hear an application for an extension
of payment time. 4 In Churchill the court explained this holding by
stating:
There can be no logical distinction drawn between the jurisdic-
tion of the court in amending the amount of disability and jurisdiction
as to the length of the term for which disability is to be received.35
Under section 59-10-25 (A), rehearings can be had only at six
month or longer intervals.3" Where the compensation period ceases
on the date an extension of the period is applied for 37 or where the
compensation period is sought to be extended long before the original
period has ended,83 the supreme court has ruled that the district
court retains jurisdiction. But there was a possibility under the terms
of the Johnson judgment that compensation would have ceased be-
fore six months had passed and a new hearing on disability could be
held. 9 This should not, however, remove jurisdiction from the dis-
trict court to determine future disability. 40
34. See note 30 rupra, 64 N.M. at 418, 329 P.2d at 435.
35. See note 32 supra, 66 N.M. at 327, 347 P.2d at 753.
36. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
37. Segura v. Jack Adams General Contractor, 64 N.M. 413, 329 P.2d 432 (1958).
38. Churchill v. City of Albuquerque, 66 N.M. 325, 347 P.2d 752 (1959).
39. The judgment was phrased as follows:
[I]n the event that plaintiff elects to have this surgery performed at the ear-
liest feasible time after trial, the defendant will pay the cost of such surgery
and will continue to pay the plaintiff total temporary disability for a period
of 90 days thereafter.
See also note 7 supra.
40. This would seem to follow from the cases which hold that latent injuries are
compensable. See, e.g., Linton v. Mauer-Neuer Meat Packers, 71 N.M. 305, 309, 378
P.2d 126, 129 (1963) where the supreme court states:
[The Workmen's Compensation Act] recognizes latent injuries. It follows,
therefore, that even though an accident causes a disability which results in
payment of compensation for a time, the employer is not necessarily relieved
of the further duty to pay compensation for a subsequent disability, which is
the "natural and direct" result of the same accident.
JULY 1968]
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Thus, there seems to be no apparent requirement or necessity
that the district court expressly retain jurisdiction with regard to
possible future disability, or that all issues of disability be de-
termined in the original proceeding.
In Johnson the court of appeals held that a final order or judg-
ment "means an order or judgment in the current proceeding that
determines the issues of law and of fact necessary to be determined
in that proceeding."' 41 The court then went on to find that the judg-
ment did not dispose of the issue of disability and hence was not
final in that respect. But, if there is no requirement that all issues
of disability be resolved in the original proceeding, this holding
appears to be contra the court's definition of final judgment.
The district court was required to determine if and to what extent
disability had existed or did actually exist at the time of the pro-
ceeding in question. It did that. It was not required in that proceed-
ing to adjudicate the claimant's future condition, 42 yet that is pre-
cisely what the court of appeals would have it do. If the district
court had made no mention of possible future disability, the judg-
ment would have been final with respect to the issue of disability. If
the court had arbitrarily stated that at the end of the ninety-day
period of temporary total disability, the plaintiff would have a ten
per cent total disability, that would have been a final judgment. Yet
neither judgment would have or even could have settled the ultimate
issue of disability so long as section 59-10-25 (A) allows a new hear-
ing on the subject every six months. The only way the issue of dis-
ability could be finally settled would be for a lump sum settlement
to be accepted by the court or for the statutory period for which
compensation could be paid to expire.
The other point relied on by the court of appeals to support its
holding of no final judgment in Johnson was the fact that the district
court failed to fix attorney's fees during the original proceeding.
The Workmen's Compensation Act, however, contains no provision
requiring that a district court set attorney's fees in order that its
judgment be final. 43 Rather, in those cases such as Johnson where
compensation has been refused and a claimant thereafter through
court proceedings collects compensation in excess of any amount
offered in settlement within thirty days of the trial:
41. Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., 432 P.2d at 269. Emphasis added.
42. See notes 30, 32, and 33 supra.
43. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act relating to attorney fees
are contained in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-23 (Repl. 1960).
[VOL. 8
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compensation to be paid the attorney for the claimant shall be fixed
by the court trying the same or the Supreme Court upon appeal in
such amount as the court may deem reasonable and proper and when
so fixed and allowed by the court shall be paid by the employer in
addition to the compensation allowed the claimant under the provi-
sions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.44
Attorney's fees are to be fixed by the district court of appeals or
the supreme court on appeal.45 There is no limitation that the
district court alone has power to set such fees or that it is absolutely
required to set them.
No case has arisen in New Mexico whereby a judgment in a work-
men's compensation case was appealed solely on the grounds that
no attorney's fees were fixed by the district court judgment. There
is early authority to indicate that the power to allow attorney's
fees rests "in the court trying (the case) alone. ' 46 But this holding
was based on a construction of an earlier statute47 which made no
mention of the supreme court.
48
The recent case of Turrieta v. Creamland Quality Chekd Dairies,
Inc.49 is more directly in point. Following the filing of a claim for
workmen's compensation, the parties entered a stipulation whereby
they agreed that the plaintiff would receive total permanent dis-
ability for a certain time. If at the end of that time, they could not
agree on the percentage of total disability, the stipulation provided
that the matter would be submitted to the court for determination.
The stipulation further provided that the court should award such
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-23 at part D.
45. Presumably the appellate court here referred to is now the court of appeals.
See note 8 supra. However, in giving the court of appeals appellate jurisdiction over
all actions under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Legislature for some reason
failed to substitute "court of appeals" for "supreme court" within the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act itself.
46. New Mexico State Highway Dept. v. Bible, 38 N.M. 372, 376, 34 P.2d 295
(1934).
47. N.M. Laws 1929, ch. 113, § 22. The pertinent provision is:
Provided, that where compensation, to which any person shall be entitled
under the provisions of this act, shall be refused, and the claimant shall there-
after collect compensation through court proceedings in an amount in excess of
the amount tendered by the employer prior to the court proceedings, then the
compensation to be paid the attorney for the claimant may be increased at the
discretion of the court trying the same, to such amount as the court may deem
reasonable and proper, and such amount when so allowed by the court, shall
be paid by the employer in addition to the compensation allowed the employee
under the provisions of this act.
48. N.M. Laws 1937, ch. 92, § 11 added the words "or the Supreme Court on
appeal."
49. 77 N.M. 192, 420 P.2d 776 (1966).
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attorney's fees as it deemed reasonable. The court approved the
stipulation and awarded 350 dollars in attorney's fees.
Approximately a year later, defendants moved for a reduction in
compensation. The district court entered a judgment reducing the
permanent disability to 15 per cent. As a part of this judgment,
the court determined that no attorney's fees should be allowed "at
the time."50 Plaintiff appealed the reduction in disability and also
the court's refusal to allow attorney's fees. The supreme court held
that the case should be remanded to the trial court with direction
that an award be made of a reasonable attorney's fee. In all other
respects, the judgment was affirmed. 51
On the basis of the Turrieta decision, it is difficult to see why a
failure to fix attorney's fees should act to prevent a final, i.e., appeal-
able, judgment. The better view would be to allow an appeal on the
merits concerning disability and remand, as the court did in Tur-
rieta, to the district court with instructions to allow reasonable
attorney's fees.
In determining whether there is a final judgment or order, the sub-
stance and not the form of the judgment or order is to be looked
to.52 Many years ago, the Iowa Supreme Court issued an opinion
that could well have served in Johnson. The court said:
It was, of course, not a final judgment in the sense that it was the
last judgment rendered in the case; but it is manifest that there is
another sense in which the words "final judgment" may be used, and
that is to denote the final determination of a substantial right for
which the action was brought.5
A substantial right was finally determined in the initial district
court proceeding in Johnson. That right was the right to compensa-
tion for disability as it was found to exist at the time of the proceed-
ing. The determination of that right should have been an appealable
judgment. To hold otherwise was to contravene the court's own
definition of "final judgment."
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID
50. Id. at 194, 420 P.2d at 778.
51. Id. at 196, 420 P.2d at 779.
52. Rio Arriba County Board of Education v. Martinez, 74 N.M. 674, 397 P.2d 471
(1964).
53. McMurray v. Day, 70 Iowa 671, 28 N.W. 476 (1886).
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